Weekly Wrap

Updates on Kurdish and Regional Affairs

(NOTE: Eye on Kurdistan produces a weekly wrap, covering major events in Kurdish-majority regions and issues affecting Kurds across their countries of residence in the Middle East.)

This Weekly Wrap has been updated.

Sharaa’s Power Grab: Syria’s Interim Constitution Sparks Uproar Among Kurds, Druze, and Liberals

Syria’s new interim constitution, approved on March 13 by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, has sparked an uproar among Kurds, Druze, and liberal Syrians. The text of the document was released the same day on the "Syrian Arab Presidency" account on X, bearing Sharaa’s signature at the bottom. The constitution marks perhaps the most critical moment in the post-Assad transition, shaping the country’s future. However, both the content of the document and the manner of its preparation have raised major concerns about Sharaa’s methods and intentions for Syria’s future.

Comprising 53 articles, the document was drafted by a constitutional committee formed by Sharaa on March 2. In less than two weeks, the committee submitted a “constitutional declaration” that will serve as the country’s constitution for the transitional period, which the document states will last for five years. During this time, Sharaa will remain Syria’s president. Despite a general declaration in the constitution about the separation of powers, the document grants Sharaa sweeping authority and effective control over the country’s nascent legislative and judicial branches. According to articles 24 and 25, the president will appoint one-third of the members of the interim parliament and form a committee that will select the remaining two-thirds. Article 47 states that Sharaa will also appoint all seven justices of the new Constitutional Court. Additionally, he has the power to appoint or dismiss all cabinet members without requiring parliamentary approval, based on Article 35 of the interim constitution. Additionally, the constitution can only be amended based on Sharaa’s proposals and with the approval of two-thirds of parliament members, as stipulated in Article 50.

Article 4 of the constitution recognizes Arabic as the sole official language of Syria. Regarding the recognition of Syria’s ethnic and cultural diversity, Article 7, paragraph 3 of the constitution makes a general statement that "the state guarantees the cultural diversity of Syrian society in all its components, as well as the cultural and linguistic rights of all Syrians." However, it does not explicitly mention languages spoken in Syria, such as Kurdish, Turkmen, and Syriac. Furthermore, the constitution retains Syria’s official Baathist-era name, the "Syrian Arab Republic." The constitution's Article 48, which addresses transitional justice, calls for "revoking all exceptional laws that inflicted harm on the Syrian people and contradict human rights," but it does not explicitly mention the fate of stateless Kurds in the country. The document’s release came just three days after what many saw as a landmark agreement between Sharaa and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander, Gen. Mazloum Abdi. That agreement offered unprecedented recognition of Kurds “as an authentic” part of the Syrian state and raised hope for restoring citizenship to hundreds of thousands of Kurds who were rendered stateless after a 1962 population census. However, the new constitution's failure to reference Kurds, their rights, or any devolution of power to provinces and municipalities has led to widespread rejection among Kurdish communities. The interim constitution is seen as a blow to Abdi’s credibility and has raised serious concerns about the new government’s intentions toward Kurds.

The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), an umbrella group that acts as the SDF’s political wing, issued a statement on March 14 condemning the document. It asserted that the constitution "reproduces authoritarianism in a new form. It entrenches central rule and grants the executive authority absolute powers.” The Council called for “a complete reformulation of the declaration” to ensure “a fair distribution of power, guarantee freedom of political activity, and recognize the rights of all Syrian components…[and] adopt a decentralized democratic system of governance with clear mechanisms for achieving transitional justice.”

The Kurdish National Council (ENKS or KNC), a rival political group to the SDC that represents several Syrian Kurdish parties linked to Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), also criticized the constitution. In a statement on March 14, ENKS called the document “disappointing,” arguing that it “ignored Syria's pluralistic nature, failing to recognize it as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state or to guarantee the national and religious rights of its communities,” ultimately reinforcing “a pattern of exclusion and monopolization of power.”

Meanwhile, Kurdish activists and supporters of various Kurdish parties took to the streets of major Kurdish cities in Rojava (northeastern Syria), such as Qamishli and Amuda, to protest against the new constitution. A common sentiment expressed both in demonstrations and on social media was, “I am Kurdish, and the Syrian Arab Republic does not represent me.”

Damascus' increasingly exclusionary stance could drive the SDC/SDF and ENKS to collaborate more closely in resisting these measures. Abdi already faced subtle criticism from KDP leader Masoud Barzani following a phone call between the two on March 12. In a subsequent statement, Barzani called for a “unified Kurdish position” in Syria, appearing to disapprove of Abdi’s unilateral decision to sign the agreement with Damascus without consulting ENKS.

Opposition to the interim constitution is not limited to Kurdish groups. Senior Druze religious leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, based in southern Syria, also criticized the document, calling it “illogical.” The constitution mandates that the president must be Muslim—without specifying the branch of Islam—and declares Islam the “principal source” of legislation. While the document promises that “the personal status laws of religious sects are protected and respected in accordance with the law,” many remain skeptical of such provisions. Concerns stem from the extremist rule that Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) had imposed in Idlib province before the Assad regime fell in December 2024. Hajri has repeatedly expressed concerns about the new authorities' conduct and has called for a civic state that respects Syria’s diverse communities. With growing ties between segments of the Druze community and Israel, it remains to be seen how this religious minority will respond to Damascus’s attempts to expand its authority. Currently, Druze communities exercise de facto control over majority-Druze areas, such as Suwayda Province.

Liberal Syrians who opposed Assad’s regime have also voiced strong disapproval of the new constitution.

Rami Jarrah, a political activist since the early days of the Syrian revolution, posted on his X account that Sharaa’s executive powers “effectively nullify the assembly [i.e., parliament] and judicial authority outlined in the draft, making the entire declaration a mockery.” He also pointed out a major shift in constitutional language, noting that, unlike previous Syrian constitutions, where Islamic law was “a major source” of legislation, the new document states it is “the primary source.” This, he warned, represents a “fundamental shift in constitutional terms, moving Syria from a civil state to an Islamic state.”

KDP-PUK Talks on Fast Track to Form New Kurdish Government

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Vice-President Masrour Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) President Bafel Talabani met in Pirmam, near Erbil, on March 16 to accelerate negotiations on forming the new Kurdistan Region cabinet and parliament. In the Kurdish parliamentary elections held last October, the KDP emerged as the leading party with 39 seats out of 100, while the PUK secured 23 seats, placing second. However, no party obtained the 51-seat majority required to form a government independently.

Following the meeting, Barzani described the discussions as “very positive and good to bring viewpoints closer to each other and discuss the issues that are important for Kurdistan’s people and the wider region.” He expressed hope that joint technical teams would build on this positive momentum to finalize the details of forming the government. Similarly, Talabani characterized the meeting as “very good,” stating that he and Barzani “agreed on several strategic issues that will be good for our people.” He confirmed that meetings would continue to finalize the new government.

Relations between the two parties have been strained in recent years, particularly since 2017, when the current PUK leadership collaborated with Iraqi forces—led by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals—to expel Kurdish forces from Kirkuk and other strategic areas in the Nineveh and Diyala provinces following the Kurdish independence referendum. Since then, the PUK has grown closer to pro-Iran groups in Baghdad, while internal disputes between the KDP and PUK have deepened over governance issues, including revenue collection and the distribution of executive power between the prime minister (from the KDP) and his deputy (from the PUK).

The PUK has accused the KDP of unilateral decision-making, while the KDP contends that the PUK restricts the prime minister’s authority over PUK-controlled areas, particularly in Sulaimaniyah and its surrounding regions. Public service provision in PUK-administered areas has deteriorated in recent years, primarily due to the establishment of a separate local revenue collection system in KDP- and PUK-controlled territories, with the proceeds used to fund public service projects. Calls for financial decentralization in PUK regions led to the unofficial implementation of this system. However, PUK-controlled areas have struggled financially due to lower revenue levels, whereas KDP-held regions benefit from Kurdistan’s major international border crossings with Turkey and a larger flow of wealth.

The KDP reportedly seeks to retain the Kurdistan Region’s top executive positions—president and prime minister—while offering the PUK a greater share of key positions, including the parliament speaker, deputy prime minister, and additional ministerial posts, to secure its participation in a coalition government.

Despite initial expectations of political deadlock—mainly due to the inflammatory rhetoric from the PUK’s leadership during the recent parliamentary elections—negotiations have proceeded more smoothly and rapidly than anticipated. Sources who spoke to Eye on Kurdistan attribute this unexpected flexibility on the PUK’s part to shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region.

These include the weakening of the Iran-led axis, with which the PUK has been closely aligned inside Iraq in recent years (although not formally a part of it), and the stronger stance of the Donald Trump administration against Tehran and, by extension, Baghdad. Additionally, key figures within the Trump administration are known to be supportive of the Kurdistan Regional Government, further influencing the course of negotiations. Recently, during a forum in Baghdad, Talabani appeared to distance himself from pro-Iran groups, calling for the dissolution of pro-Iran militias and warning that any attacks by these groups on Kurdistan's energy infrastructure would be met with a forceful response.

Beyond government formation, the two parties appear to be negotiating a broader strategic agreement aimed at stabilizing governance and improving intra-KDP-PUK relations in the coming years, based on a shared vision of mutual interests. Between 2006 and 2012, the two parties enjoyed friendly relations and close coordination on key issues due to a strategic agreement signed at the time between their leaderships.

PKK and Turkish Leaders Continue Speaking at Cross Purposes on Peace Efforts

As efforts to resolve the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency continue in Turkey, growing indications suggest a fundamental mismatch between the Turkish government and PKK officials regarding the objectives and mechanisms of the process.

This divergence became more evident on March 14, when PKK senior leader and founding member Cemil Bayik called for a halt to Turkish military operations to allow the party to convene its congress. Holding a party congress is a key step in implementing PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s February 27 call for the group to disarm and dissolve itself. In response to Ocalan’s appeal, the PKK declared a ceasefire on March 1. However, Turkish military operations against PKK targets have continued despite the Kurdish group’s ceasefire.

"Every day [Turkish] reconnaissance planes are flying overhead. They are carrying out daily bombings, and they attack every day," Bayik told the Kurdish television channel Sterk TV. "Holding a congress in these conditions is impossible and very dangerous."

Bayik also urged Turkish authorities to establish legal and political frameworks that protect Kurdish voices and facilitate a shift from military confrontation to meaningful dialogue.

However, just one day later, Turkish Defense Minister Yesar Guler reaffirmed the Turkish government’s demand for the PKK to dissolve "as soon as possible" and surrender its weapons unconditionally in all regions. Guler’s remarks also appeared to be directed at the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which Turkey considers part of the PKK. Both the PKK and the SDF deny any organizational connection.

Guler firmly rejected any calls for a Turkish military ceasefire toward the PKK, stating, “Such a thing is absolutely out of the question." His statement suggested that, since Ocalan’s message did not explicitly call on Turkey to announce a ceasefire, Turkish forces were not obligated to do so—implying that Ocalan’s message was a negotiated text between him and the Turkish government.

While the PKK and Kurdish leaders frame the process as a mutual peace effort, Turkish officials continue to depict it as part of the state’s "counterterrorism" operations. This fundamental gap in both sides’ perceptions and objectives raises serious doubts about the prospects for a successful resolution.